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TWO DEFLATIONARY APPROACHES TO FITCH-STYLE REASONING 
 
Christoph Kelp and Duncan Pritchard 
University of Stirling 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf 
of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that 
argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The 
first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity 
principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second 
approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of 
semantic anti-realismis shown to have considerable prima facie appeal. It is then argued 
that some key objections that one might raise for this approach are on closer inspection 
ineffective. 
 
 
0. INTRODUCTION 
 
Frederic Fitch (1963) famously argued that the thesis that all truths are knowable (henceforth, 
the knowability principle), in conjunction with a handful of apparently highly plausible logical 
and epistemic principles, entails the obviously absurd claim that all truths are known. This 
argument has become known as the paradox of knowability. Of course, it is only a paradox if 
one finds the knowability principle highly plausible in the first place, since a basic pre-
requisite of an argument qualifying as a paradox is surely that it involves a highly 
contentiousindeed, unacceptableconclusion which validly follows from highly plausible 
premises. Moreover, there is good independent reason to think that such a principle is not so 
plausible. It seems that the principle knowability is naturally understood as applying to 
cognizers like us; that is, to subjects with finite cognitive capacities and a finite lifespan. At 
the same time, it is plausible that there are some propositions that are too large to be grasped 
by such cognizers—for instance, some disjunctions with infinitely many disjuncts. If these 
finite cognizers cannot grasp such propositions, however, then they cannot know them either. 
In consequence, for cognizers like us, some propositions must remain unknown. Provided that 
the principle of knowability is naturally understood as applying to cognizers like us, then it is 
not plausible that it is true. If so, however, the ‘paradox’ of knowability, then, isn’t strictly 
speaking a paradox at all.1,2  
 Nevertheless, there are (as we will see in a moment) substantive philosophical grounds 
in favour of the knowability principle, and thus even if Fitch’s argument does not point to a 
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paradox as such it may still be thought to be a potential reductio of those philosophical views 
which feel the theoretical need to incorporate this principle. Accordingly, if there are such 
theoretical views then its defenders had better have something compelling to say in response 
to Fitch’s argument.  
In this paper, we will look at one—perhaps the only—theoretical view to which, on 
the face of it, the knowability principle is of central importance. We will then consider two 
deflationary responses to Fitch’s argument on behalf of defenders of this view. What we mean 
by a ‘deflationary’ response to the argument is a proposal which proceeds by weakening, on a 
principled basis, one of the principles essentially employed by that argument. The motivation 
for this strategy is this: ceteris paribus, if one can accommodate the considerations which 
prompt adoption of a certain principle by advancing a version of that principle which is 
(perhaps only slightly) logically weaker, then one ought to do so. If one can further show that 
the Fitch argument is blocked once the weaker ‘deflated’ version of the principle is adopted, 
then one will have succeeded in offering a deflationary response to the argument.3 
The first deflationary response that we will consider proceeds by weakening the 
factivity principle for knowledge. We will argue that this strategy does not stand up to closer 
inspection. Nevertheless, we claim that there are good grounds for holding that the second 
deflationary response that we considerwhich rejects the principle of knowability in favour 
of a weaker principleis effective at resolving the problem posed by Fitch’s argument.  
 
 
1. SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM 
 
The view to which the knowability principle is, on the face of it, of central importance, is 
often labelled ‘semantic anti-realism’. Semantic anti-realism is the rejection of realist theories 
of meaning (i.e., semantic realism). Indeed, semantic anti-realists often explicitly motivate 
their position by pointing to defects in realist theories of meaning. In this section, we will 
outline the problems which, according to the semantic anti-realist, beset realist theories of 
meaning and show how accepting the knowability principle can potentially avoid these 
problems.  
To begin with, let us look at the credentials of realist theories of meaning. Realist 
theories of meaning are commonly construed as having the following two features: 
 
(1) The meaning of a statement is identified with its truth conditions. 
(2) There are evidence-transcendent truths.4  
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From these features of realist theories of meaning it follows that some statements have 
evidence-transcendent truth-conditions as their meanings. A general constraint on a theory of 
meaning is that it should at least be compatible with a theory of understandingthat is, for a 
theory of meaning to be satisfactory it must be compatible with an account of what a 
competent speakers’ linguistic understanding consists in.5 Semantic anti-realists suspect that 
realist theories of meaning will be unsatisfactory on just score because they are incompatible 
with a satisfactory account of our understanding of statements with evidence-transcendent 
truth-conditions. 
Semantic anti-realists base their suspicion on a challenge to realist theories of meaning 
which arises from what they consider to be an important Wittgensteinian insight into the 
nature of understandingviz., that understanding a concept consists in a set of practical 
abilities rather than in a state of mind. Certainly, if one is to be credited with a given practical 
ability then one must be able to manifest that ability in one’s behaviour. For instance, a child 
will be credited with the ability to swim only if she is able to manifest swimming behaviour in 
suitable circumstances. Hence, if the Wittgensteinian insight is to be taken seriouslythat is, 
if understanding is to be conceived of as a set of practical abilitiesthen understanding must 
be manifestable in behaviour too. Presumably, the kind of behaviour in which understanding 
must be manifestable is linguistic behaviour (i.e., language use). According to the semantic 
anti-realist, however, what would countat least minimallyas a manifestation by a speaker 
of her understanding of a statement in use is that the speaker is able to evaluate her own and 
other peoples’ use of the statement and, if circumstances render it appropriate, to adjust her 
use of it accordingly.6  
Given that we understand what counts as manifestation of understanding in use in this 
way, however, it is hard to see how understanding of statements with evidence-transcendent 
truth-conditions could be manifested in use. After all, the truth-conditions of such statements 
are evidence-transcendent. As a result, there aren’t any circumstances that would provide the 
basis for an evaluation of one’s own or other people’s use of such statements. And, similarly, 
there aren’t any circumstances in the light of which one would adjust one’s use of such 
statements. If there aren’t any such circumstances, then understanding of statements with 
evidence-transcendent truth-conditions cannot be manifested. And if understanding of such 
statements cannot be manifested, then it does not consist in a set of practical abilities after 
allcontrary to what the Wittgensteinian insight suggests. Accordingly, the challenge that 
semantic anti-realists pose to their realist opponents is to provide an account of understanding 
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of statements with evidence-transcendent truth-conditions that is both faithful to the two core 
realist theses and respects the Wittgensteinian insight. Their suspicion is that this cannot be 
done.7 
A related challenge that semantic anti-realists pose to semantic realists focuses on the 
acquisition of our understanding of statements with evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. 
Since if we accept a truth-conditional theory of meaning we acquire our understanding of a 
type of statement by bringing to bear evidence on the truth-values of instances of it, semantic 
anti-realists argue that it is hard to see how we could so much as acquire an understanding of 
statements with evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. Accordingly, semantic anti-realists 
challenge their opponents to provide an account of how we acquire our understanding of 
statements with evidence-transcendent truth-conditions.8 
These two challenges were first advanced by Michael Dummett (1978) and have 
become known as the manifestation and the acquisition challenge, respectively.9 Although 
there are further anti-realist arguments, these challengesand the manifestation challenge in 
particularappear to be the most common reason offered by semantic anti-realists as to why 
they find realist theories of meaning problematic.10 Accordingly, semantic anti-realists have 
proceeded to deny at least one of the two core theses of realist theories of meaning.  
Initially, semantic anti-realists were tempted to deny the realist’s first core claimi.e., 
the commitment to a truth-conditional theory of meaningand replace it with a theory that 
identifies the meanings of statements with their assertibility conditions. The rationale for this 
is obvious, since by tying the meaning of a statement to its assertibility conditions (which are 
held not to be evidence-transcendent) rather than its truth-conditions, the anti-realist avoids 
the problems posed for a theory of meaning by allowing evidence-transcendent truths. 
More recently, however, this option appears to have become less appealing to 
semantic anti-realists. Instead, they have tended to reject the realists’ second core claimi.e., 
that there are evidence-transcendent truths.11 It ought to be clear that accepting the possibility 
of evidence-transcendent truths entails accepting the existence of unknowable truths, at least 
if one accepts the further (highly plausible) claim that in order to know a proposition one must 
have evidence in favour of it. Accordingly, if one holds, with the knowability principle, that 
there cannot be any unknowable truths, then it follows that one must reject the idea that there 
are evidence-transcendent truths as well. Given the foregoing, there is clearly a large 
theoretical pay-off in rejecting this key realist claim, since it avoids the worries just noted 
regarding our understanding of such truths. If there aren’t any such truths, then the fact that it 
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is doubtful whether an understanding of them can be manifestedor acquired for that 
matterwon’t be a problem for the semantic anti-realist.  
Given that our primary interest is the Fitch argument, it is this second strand of 
semantic anti-realist thoughtwhich, like the Fitch argument, has the knowability principle at 
its heartthat is our concern here. Henceforth, when we talk of ‘semantic anti-realism’ we 
will have this specific variety of semantic anti-realism in mind. 
 
 
2. FITCH’S ARGUMENT 
 
Fitch’s argument clearly poses a fundamental challenge to semantic anti-realism. Indeed, 
given that it is an undeniable truth that we are not omniscient, unless the semantic anti-realist 
can find some way to block this argument then she is faced with a reductio of her position. In 
order to be able to discuss some options the semantic anti-realist may have to block Fitch’s 
argument, it will be a good idea to look at how the argument proceeds in a bit more detail. 
First, we will formalise the knowability principle in the following way:12 
 
 (KP) (∀P)(P → ◊(∃s,t)(Ks,t P)) 
 
Now we assume, for reductio, that one is not omniscienti.e., that there is some truth (we’ll 
call it ‘P1’) which is unknown: 
 
 (1) P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1) 
 
Given (KP), however, one can straightforwardly derive (2): 
 
 (2) ◊(∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1))) 
 
An essential feature of Fitch’s argument at this point is a sub-argument to the effect that (2) is 
false. This proceeds by first assuming, for reductio, that the statement within the scope of the 
possibility operator at line (2) is true: 
 
(3) (∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1))) 
 
Plausibly, knowledge distributes across conjunctions, such that if a conjunction is known, 
then so are both of the conjuncts: 
 
 (4) (∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 P1) & (∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1)) 
 
Most will also agree that knowledge is factive, such that if one knows a proposition, then that 
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proposition must be true. We can thus conclude (5): 
 
 (5) (∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 P1) & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1) 
 
This is, of course, a contradiction. Since the assumption of this sub-argument leads to 
contradiction, we can therefore infer the negation of this assumption: 
 
 (6) ¬(∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1))) 
 
Moreover, since this result has been derived based on no assumptions, we can also conclude 
that it is a necessary truth: 
 
 (7)  ¬(∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1))) 
 
Using standard modal logic, however, we can infer (8) from (7): 
 
 (8) ¬◊(∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1))) 
 
Now (8) is obviously inconsistent with (2). It therefore follows that the original 
assumptionthat we are non-omniscientmust be denied.  
 The knowability principle, at least when combined with some very basic epistemic and 
modal logic, is therefore inconsistent with non-omniscience such that if we retain this 
principle then we must, it seems, accept the absurd conclusion that that all truths are known.13 
Fitch’s argument therefore poses a serious problem for semantic anti-realism. In the 
remainder of this paper we will explore two deflationary approaches that the semantic anti-
realist could pursue in order to evade this argument. 
 
 
3. A DEFLATIONARY APPROACH TO FITCH’S ARGUMENT I: 
WEAKENING THE FACTIVITY PRINCIPLE 
 
The first deflationary proposal that we will be exploring considers the prospects of offering an 
anti-realist response to Fitch’s argument which denies the factivity of knowledge. It should be 
quite obvious that once the factivity of knowledge is denied, the argument that leads to the 
paradox, at least in its present form, will no longer go through since the step from (4) to (5) 
will no longer be valid. 
 Of course, it is easy to say that one does not accept factivity and that, therefore, one 
isn’t impressed by Fitch’s argument. However, factivity seems to play an importantindeed, 
indispensablerole in any plausible theory of knowledge. In particular, it is one of the central 
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guiding intuitions regarding knowledge that one cannot know falsehoods. That is, the very 
idea that there could be a case in which an agent knows a proposition and yet that proposition 
is false, just seems plain incoherent. Now of course one might claim that even the most deeply 
entrenched intuitions could be called into question on theoretical grounds. Even if this is so, 
however, it remains that any theory which denied factivity and thereby held that it was 
possible to know falsehoods would face a pretty severe up-hill struggle when it came to 
gaining widespread acceptance. 
 Nevertheless, there may be some room for manoeuvre here. After all, as we will now 
see, there is a potential logical gapat least by semantic anti-realist lightsbetween the 
claim that there cannot exist any cases in which an agent knows a falsehood and the factivity 
claim that knowledge entails the truth of the proposition known. If this is right, then the 
semantic anti-realist can exploit this logical gap in order to motivate a weakened version of 
the factivity principle which can nevertheless retain the core guiding intuition behind factivity 
that there cannot exist cases of false knowledge. 
 In order to see this, let us first state factivity more formally: 
 
 (FAC) (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)(Ks,t P → P) 
 
Furthermore, let us state explicitly the intuition that is meant to drive adoption of 
(FAC)viz., that there are no cases of false knowledge:14 
 
(*) ¬(∃P)(∃s)(∃t)(Ks,t P & ¬P) 
 
Now from (*) we can derive (**): 
 
(**) (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)¬(Ks,t P & ¬P) 
 
And from (**) we can derive (***): 
 
(***) (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)(Ks,t P → ¬¬P) 
 
From (***) it might seem like a very small move indeed to get to (FAC), since all one needs 
to do is introduce the double negation equivalence rule (DNE) to eliminate the double 
negation in the embedded consequent. Crucially, however, intuitionistic logic does not 
contain (DNE), and yet it is precisely this logic that semantic anti-realists typically endorse. 
Accordingly, it follows that an anti-realist can accept the intuition guiding adoption of 
(FAC)which we have expressed as (*)without being compelled to endorse (FAC) itself. 
Instead, this guiding intuition merely entails the weaker claim which we have expressed as 
(***), but which it is open to the semantic anti-realist to argue is itself a respectable version of 
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factivity. We will call this weakened version of factivity, (FAC*): 
 
 (FAC*) (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)(Ks,t P → ¬¬P) 
 
 This line of reasoning seems deflationary in just the right sort of way, since it shows 
that there is, at least by the lights of a particular theoretical outlook, a way of properly 
responding to the core intuition motivating (FAC) which results in a logically weaker 
principle. If this logically weaker principle can help the semantic anti-realist block Fitch’s 
argument, then this would thus be an extremely attractive way of resolving the situation.  
 Unfortunately, however, closer inspection reveals that the present proposal is 
ultimately unsuccessful. True, on the face of it, (FAC*) blocks the move from line (4) to line 
(5) in that it only gives us (5*): 
 
 (5*) (∃s2,t2)(Ks2,t2 P1) & ¬¬¬(∃sl,t1)(Ks1,t1 P1) 
 
Crucially, however, this triple negation collapses into a single negation, even within an 
intuitionistic logic, and thus one will be able to derive line (5) of the paradox of knowability 
anyway, even without having to appeal to (FAC).  
 So one won’t solve the paradox of knowability by rejecting the factivity of knowledge 
and replacing it by the ever so slightly weaker (FAC*). In order to get this line to work one 
would have to replace the factivity principle with something that is weaker even than (FAC*). 
The difficulty facing such a proposal, however, is that it will not be able to do full justice to 
our intuition that one cannot know falsehoods. In this way, it is highly doubtful whether the 
present deflationary strategy can ultimately be successful.15 
 
 
4. A DEFLATIONARY APPROACH TO FITCH’S ARGUMENT II: 
WEAKENING THE KNOWABILITY PRINCIPLE 
 
Although the proposal to deny factivity will not do the trick, there is a second proposal 
available that is in the same deflationary spirit and which is much more promising. The 
thought is that instead of rejecting one of the epistemic principles which are employed within 
Fitch’s argument, one instead rejects the very principle that is the target of that 
argumenti.e., the knowability principle itself. In its stead is then put forward a slightly 
weaker principle which can nevertheless accommodate the guiding motivation behind the 
knowability principle.  
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Informally, the weakened principle that we have in mind is as follows: for all true 
propositions, it must be possible to justifiably believe them. More formally: 
 
(JP) (∀P)(P → ◊(∃s,t)(JBs,t P)) 
 
In order to see why this principle of justified believability, as we will call it, suits the purposes 
of the semantic anti-realist it is important to first notice that it accommodates the semantic 
anti-realists’ worries regarding realist theories of meaning.  
Recall that the semantic anti-realist argued that realist theories of meaning will have a 
problem explaining how we can acquire and manifest an understanding of the meanings of 
statements with evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. Recall, furthermore, that we saw that 
accepting the knowability principle will avoid this problem. Given the plausible additional 
assumption that one knows a proposition only if one also has evidence for it, it follows that if 
all truths are knowable then it must also be possible to have evidence for them. If it must be 
possible to have evidence for all true propositions, however, then there can be no evidence-
transcendent truths. In this way, the semantic anti-realist can resist the realist’s second core 
claim that there are evidence-transcendent truths by accepting the knowability principle.  
Notice, however, that a parallel argument will show that accepting the justified 
believability principle will do the job just as well. After all, it is also plausible that one 
justifiably believes a proposition only if one has evidence for it. That means, however, that if, 
for all truths, it must be possible to justifiably believe them, then it must also be possible to 
have evidence for them. But if it must be possible to have evidence for all true propositions, 
then there can be no evidence-transcendent truths. In this way, the semantic anti-realist can 
resist the realist’s second core claim by accepting the justified believability principle. In short, 
this principle will do the job for the semantic anti-realist just as well as the knowability 
principle. 
 Notice that while replacing the knowability principle with the justified believability 
principle will allow the semantic anti-realist to avoid the conclusion that we are omniscient—
after all, justified belief is not knowledge16—that does not mean that the semantic anti-realist 
is no longer susceptible to refutation by a Fitch-style argument. After all, a parallel argument 
for justified belief threatens to show that the justified believability principle entails that all 
statements are justifiably believed. And that, it would seem, is almost as bad for the semantic 
anti-realist as the original conclusion of Fitch’s argument. So there is still work to be done.  
One might think, however, that even if there is work to be done, it is not much work. 
After all, justified belief, as opposed to knowledge, is not factive. That is, one can justifiably 
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believe a falsehood. For instance, one might reliably and conscientiously form the belief that 
there is a barn over thereand thereby have a justified belief in this propositioneven 
though this belief is nonetheless false because, unbeknownst to you, what you are in fact 
looking at is a barn façade. Accordingly, since Fitch’s argument relies on the factivity of 
knowledge, it follows that it will not go through if the knowledge operator is replaced by a 
justified belief operator. Hence it would seem as though all the semantic anti-realist has to do 
is to replace the knowability principle with the justified believability principle in order to 
avoid the conclusion of Fitch-style reasoning. 
 
 
5. PROBLEMS WITH THE SECOND DEFLATIONARY APPROACH TO FITCH-STYLE 
REASONING 
 
There are, however, problems on the horizon for this line of reasoning. In particular, one 
might think that the conclusion just canvassed is either false or uninteresting. To take the first 
horn first, one might think that it is false because even granted that justified belief is not 
factive, the following reflection principle does, nonetheless, hold: if, at a certain time, one 
justifiably believes that one does not at that time justifiably believe a proposition, then one 
does not at that time justifiably believe that proposition. More formally, we can express this 
principle as follows: 
 
(RP)  (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)(JBs,t (¬JBs,t P) → ¬JBs,t P)) 
 
The significance of this principle is that the relevant ‘factivity’ move in a Fitch-style 
argument employing the justified belief operator would be from (4’) to (5’):  
 
 (4’) (∃s2,t2)(JBs2,t2 P1) & (∃s2,t2)(JBs2,t2 ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P1)) 
 (5’) (∃s2,t2)(JBs2,t2 P1) & ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P1) 
 
If the justified belief operator were factive, then that would straightforwardly licence this 
inference. It ought to be clear, however, that even if the justified belief is not factive, then this 
inference will go through just so long as (RP) holds. So one might object that the mere fact 
that justified belief is not factive does not get the semantic anti-realist off the hook, since it is 
still plausible that justified belief satisfies the reflection principle which, it would seem, 
suffices to generate the Fitch result. 
 On the other hand, one might object that the result is uninteresting because it has long 
been established that the semantic anti-realist can resist the conclusion of Fitch-style 
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argument by stating the epistemic constraint on truth in terms of justified believability. J. L. 
Mackie makes the point in the following passage: 
 
Suppose we read K [the knowledge operator in Fitch’s argument] as ‘It is justifiably believed 
at t1 that …’ This will distribute over &, but we might expect the argument now to fail at step 
4 [to 5 in the above statement of the argument], since this K is not truth-entailing. But step 4 
[to 5] still goes through. If it is justifiably believed that p at t1 that p is not justifiably believed 
at t1, then p is not justifiably believed at t1. On the other hand, if we read K as ‘It is justifiably 
believed at some time that…’, then step 4 does not go through. It does not follow that if it is 
justifiably believed at any time that p is not justifiably believed at any time, then p is not 
justifiably believed at any time. It might be justifiable at t1 to think that p is false and never 
has been and never will be justifiably believed and yet there might be some other time t2 at 
which p was, or will be justifiably believed. So the argument does not enable us to reject the 
principle that what is true can be justifiably believed at some time. (Mackie 1980, 91-2) 
 
In this passage, Mackie distinguishes between two reflection principles for justified belief, 
one which he deems plausible and one which he deems implausible. The plausible reflection 
principle has it that if it is justifiably believed at t1 that it is not justifiably believed at t1 that p, 
then it is not justifiably believed at t1 that p. This is, of course, the reflection 
principle(RP)that we formulated above. In contrast, according to the implausible 
reflection principle, if someone at some time justifiably believes that no-one ever justifiably 
believes that p, then no-one ever justifiably believes that p. This principle can be formalised in 
the following way: 
 
(RP*) (∀P)((∃s,t)(JBs,t ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P)) → ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P))) 
 
Mackie claims, correctly and for the right reasons, that (RP*) is false. He goes on to claim, 
again correctly, that the conclusion of Fitch’s argument can be avoided if the epistemic 
constraint is construed in terms of justified believability at some timei.e., what we have 
called the justified believability principle. Unfortunately, however, this last claim, while 
correct, is made for the wrong reasons. For, as we are about to show, Fitch’s conclusion can 
be derived from (RP), which Mackie deems plausible, and the justified believability principle. 
To begin with, we start with the relevant assumption for reductiosomeone at some 
time justifiably believes that p and that no-one ever justifiably believes that p: 
 
(3’’) (∃s2,t2)(JBs2,t2 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P1))) 
 
If (3’’) is true, then so is an instance of it. Or in other words, if someone at some time 
justifiably believes that p and that no-one ever justifiably believes that p, then there must be a 
particular epistemic subject who believes this conjunction at a particular time. Let the 
epistemic subject and time be s3 and t3, respectively. We then get: 
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(4’’) JBs3,t3 (P1 & ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P1))) 
 
Since justified belief distributes across conjunctions, we get: 
 
(5’’) JBs3,t3 P1 & JBs3,t3 ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P1) 
 
Now if one justifiably believes that there is no-one at any time who justifiably believes that 
P1, then one also justifiably believes that, currently, one does not justifiably believe P1 
oneself.17 Accordingly, from (5’’) we can derive: 
 
(6’’) JBs3,t3 P1 & JBs3,t3 (¬JBs3,t3 P1) 
 
Given (RP), however, the second conjunct of (6’’) entails that s3 does not justifiably believe 
P1 at t3: 
 
(7’’) JBs3,t3 P1 & ¬JBs3,t3 P1 
 
From here the Fitch-style argument proceeds as rehearsed. So we can argue to its conclusion 
without having to appeal to the implausible reflection principle, (RP*). All that we need is 
(RP) which Mackie deems a plausible reflection principle. So Mackie’s distinction between 
the two reflection principles will not help the semantic anti-realist. If the semantic anti-realist 
is to get any mileage out of rejecting the principle of knowability and replacing it by the 
weaker principle of justified believability, then she must have some other way of resisting the 
Fitch-style conclusion.  
Fortunately for the semantic anti-realist, however, there is excellent reason to believe 
that (RP) does not hold. Consider the following case due to Saul Kripke: Pierre is a 
Frenchman who has lived most of his life in France. Having just returned from a trip to 
London, one of Pierre’s best friends asserts “Londres est jolie.” Since Pierre knows his friend 
to be a man of exceptional taste he believes what his friend asserted and hence comes to 
believe that London is pretty. Now suppose that, by some unfortunate circumstance, Pierre 
finds himself stuck in a particularly unattractive part of London. Pierre is forced take on a 
badly paid job that will just pay him enough to buy food and accommodation. At this time he 
learns English ‘directly’that is, by direct interactions with other English speakers rather 
than referring to, say, translation manuals. Pierre uses the term ‘London’ as his neighbours do 
and learns everything his neighbours know about it which, let us suppose for the sake of 
argument, is not very much. On the basis of his experiences in the city he comes to believe 
that London is not pretty. At the same time, Pierre is still sometimes thinking about his nice 
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life in France, and sometimes even of his friend who told him about the pretty city of London. 
In such moments Pierre thinks to himself: “Si seulement je serais en Londres …” Obviously, 
Pierre still believes that London is pretty and hence he has inconsistent beliefs. Moreover, his 
inconsistent beliefs are both justified. The testimony from a person with exceptional taste 
justifies his belief that London is pretty while his direct experiences justify his belief that 
London isn’t pretty.  
 It is plausible that whilst having inconsistent beliefs that are both justified, Pierre may 
also believe, justifiably, that he does not believe that London is pretty. Perhaps some 
psychologist analyses him and tells him that the source of his recent unhappiness is simply 
that he no longer believes himself to be living in a pretty city. Pierre thus comes to believe, 
and justifiably so (since on the basis of the reliable testimony from the psychologist), that he 
does not believe that London is pretty. But if one justifiably believes that one does not believe 
a proposition, then one also justifiably believes that one does not justifiably believe that 
proposition. Accordingly, Pierre also justifiably believes that he does not justifiably believe 
that London is a pretty city. 
 Pierre’s case thus indicates that one can simultaneously justifiably believe all of the 
following: (a) a proposition, P, (b) its negation, not-P, and (c) the proposition that one does 
not justifiably believe P. Given that this is so, however, it can easily be seen that the reflection 
principle (RP) must fail. For if (RP) held, it would follow that Pierre both does and does not 
justifiably believe that London is pretty. (RP) turns an inconsistency in Pierre’s belief-system 
(in conjunction with a second-order belief), into an inconsistency in the world. So it must be 
false.18 If (RP) is false, however, then the relevant Fitch-style argument no longer goes 
through. The semantic anti-realist is off the hook. 
 There is, however, a further difficulty for the semantic anti-realist who endorses the 
justified believability principle. It remains true that since there are some statements that are 
true but will never be justifiably believed, it must, by the justified believability principle, also 
be possible for someone at some time to justifiably believe an instance of this. Among other 
things that means that it must be possible for someone at some time to justifiably believe 
statements of the form “P but no-one ever justifiably believes P” and, similarly, “P but I don’t 
justifiably believe P”. And, as Dorothy Edgington (1985, 558) has pointed out, one might 
think that this is already bad enough for the semantic anti-realist. After all, it would seem that 
one just couldn’t have any evidence for statements of either form. If so, then it would seem 
that one also cannot justifiably believe such statements.  
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Moreover, recall that the semantic anti-realist introduces the justified believability 
principle in order to ensure that meaning, construed truth-conditionally, can always be 
manifested in use. If there are truths of the form “P and no-one ever justifiably believes P” 
and “P and I don’t justifiably believe P”, then one must be able to manifest the meaning of 
those statements in understanding. Since justified believability is supposed to secure 
manifestability, it must be possible to justifiably believe statements of the form “P and no-one 
ever justifiably believes P” and “P and I don’t justifiably believe P”. But if it is impossible to 
have evidence that would support statements of this form, then one cannot justifiably believe 
such statements. So even if the semantic anti-realist can deny the reflection principle, (RP), 
Fitch’s argument shows that things are already bad enough for the semantic anti-realist even 
before the problematic principle comes into play. 
 It would seem, however, that there are ways for the semantic anti-realist to respond to 
this difficulty. Let us begin with statements of the form “P and I don’t justifiably believe that 
P”. In order to argue that statements of this form can be justifiably believed, the semantic 
anti-realist can simply point to Pierre’s case again and claim that Pierre might well come to 
believe that London is pretty (by believing that the proposition expressed by “Londres est 
jolie” is true) and that he does not believe that London is pretty (by believing that the 
proposition expressed by “I don’t believe that London is pretty” is also true). Since both of his 
beliefs are justified and since we typically acquire a justified belief in a conjunction by 
conjoining the justification we have for the beliefs in the conjuncts,19 it would follow that the 
semantic anti-realist can comfortably allow that Pierre justifiably believes that London is 
pretty and that he does not justifiably believe that London is pretty.20 
 Things are a bit more difficult when it comes to statements of the form “P and no-one 
ever justifiably believes that P”. However, the situation is not hopeless for the semantic anti-
realist. Consider, for instance, a case in which I am stranded on a lonely island. The only thing 
I have with me is a book about psychology which is written in English. I read about a brain 
lesion, named ‘X’, and learn that the only symptom of X, which occurs in 99% of the cases, is 
a continuous strong belief on the part of the patient that she has X. Through introspection, I 
find that I don’t believe that I have X. I therefore come to believe that I don’t believe that I 
have X. My belief, since based on reliable introspective capacities, is justified. I justifiably 
believe that I don’t believe that I have X. Since if one justifiably believes that one does not 
believe a proposition, P, then one also justifiably believes that one does not justifiably believe 
P, I justifiably believe that I don’t justifiably believe that I have X. Moreover, since I am on a 
lonely island, without drinkable water, and since I have every reason to believe that no-one 
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will come to my rescue and that I will die fairly soon, I also justifiably believe that no-one 
will ever justifiably believe that I have X. To finish the story off, suppose that just before I 
left for my holiday, I called my doctor to get the results for some brain tests that they had 
done on me. My doctor told me that everything was fine except that I have a brain condition 
called ‘Y’, which is completely harmless, and that I could go on the trip without any problem. 
On the basis of the testimony from my doctor I come to believe, justifiably, that I have Y. 
Now, since I am German and have talked to my German doctor our conversation was 
naturally in German. What I don’t know is that the German expression ‘Y’ and the English 
expression ‘X’ are names for the same brain lesion and that I am among the lucky 1% of 
patients who don’t suffer from the symptoms. I am now in a condition in which I justifiably 
believe that I have X (on the basis of testimony from my doctor: ‘Sie haben Y’) and I also 
justifiably believe that no-one ever justifiably believes that I have X (on the basis of 
introspection, what I have read about X in the psychology book and my unfortunate 
predicament of being on a lonely island about to die). If I were to conjoin my two beliefs, I 
would justifiably believe that I have X and that no-one ever justifiably believes that I have X. 
There is thus a way for the semantic anti-realist to respond to Edgington’s worry. The 
semantic anti-realist may point out that, contrary to what Edgington claimed, one can 
justifiability believe statements of the form “P and I don’t justifiably believe P” as well as “P 
and no-one ever justifiably believes P”. The semantic anti-realist is, again, off the hook. In 
general, there are good grounds for holding that the deflationary strategy of replacing the 
knowability principle with the justified believing principle may well offer the semantic anti-
realist a way of avoiding Fitch-style reasoning.21 
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NOTES 
 
1 The thesis that the ‘paradox’ of knowability is not really a paradox has also been defended by Williamson 
(2000, ch. 12). 
2  Of course, one might find it independently puzzling that it is even possible to derive the conclusion that all 
truths are known from the premise that all truths are knowable. Fitch’s argument would then be philosophically 
interesting even if one did not find the knowability principle plausible. Still, what is making the 
argumenttaken in isolationphilosophically interesting is not that it poses a paradox. 
3  This deflationary strategyapplied to epistemological issuesis explored and defended at greater length in 
Pritchard (2004). See also Greenough (2002).  
4  Cf. Wright (1993, 250). We take it that for present purposes this is an adequate representation of Wright’s 
statement of realism: “Realism about a given discourse, for the purposes of the Manifestation Challenge, is 
simply the combination of views (a) that the proper account of our understanding of its statements is evidence-
transcendent truth-conditional, and (b) that the world on occasion exploits, so to speak, this understandingdoes 
on occasion deliver undetectable truth-conferrers to such statements.” (Ibid.) 
5  Cf. Wright (1993, 47). 
6  Cf. Wright (1993, 247). 
7  Cf. Wright (1993, 247-8). 
8  Cf. Wright (1993, 87). 
9  See also Dummett (1993).  
10  For two further anti-realist arguments, see Wright (1993), who outlines a challenge that proceeds from the 
normativity of meaning, and Putnam (1981), who adduces the so-called ‘model-theoretic’ argument. Most 
contemporary anti-realists appear to accept the manifestation challenge. For examples, see Dummett (1978; 
1993), Wright (1993) and Tennant (1997). 
11  For a good contrast of the two anti-realist approaches, compare the early and later essays collected in Wright 
(1993). 
12  We will take quantification over propositions (P, P1 etc.,), subjects (s, s1 etc.,), and times (t, t1 etc.,) for 
granted. For a statement of the argument that does not rely on substitutional quantification, see Kvanvig (1995). 
13  See Williamson (1988; 1992) for an argument to the effect that the conclusion just canvassedthat all truths 
are knownwill not follow within intuitionistic logic from Fitch’s reasoning, even though it does follow that 
non-omniscience is false. For an excellent overview of the debate regarding Fitch’s puzzle, see Brogaard & 
Salerno (2004). 
14  Note that to avoid unnecessary complications, we have here expressed the intuition in a slightly weaker 
formi.e., that there are no cases of false knowledge, rather than that it is impossible for there to be cases of 
false knowledge. Nothing in what follows turns on this.  
15  Interestingly, in some recent (and unpublished) work Finn Spicer and Allan Hazlett have independently 
argued that there are good grounds for rejecting (FAC) outright. In particular, they argue for the plausibility of 
the claim that knowledge is best understood as reliable true belief. Thus, since one can have a reliably-formed 
false belief, it follows that (FAC) must go. If such an argument could be made compelling, then it would hold 
out the prospect that the semantic anti-realist could exploit this proposal in order to block the Fitch argument on 
non-factivity grounds. Notice, however, that such a suggestion is not within a deflationary spirit. That is, unlike 
the deflationary proposal explored here, the move is not towards offering a logically weaker formulation of 
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factivity which can nevertheless do justice (by the broader lights of that theory at any rate) to the intuitions 
which drive acceptance of factivity. Instead, this line of argument involves the straightforward rejection of those 
intuitions. This feature of the proposal makes this sort of manoeuvre dialectically problematic, and certainly 
ensures that it is not relevant for our purposes here. 
16  At least on standard views of justification at any rate. If one held that justification was factive, then there 
would be scope to contend that there is no logical gap between justified belief and knowledge. Such a theory of 
justification would be highly revisionary, however, and so we can legitimately set this possibility to one side 
here. 
17  Some may object that the step from (5’’) to (6’’) will not go through because justified belief is not closed 
under known entailment (never mind under entailment simpliciter). However, the argument does not depend on 
such closure principles. It is plausible that if (RP) is valid—that is if one justifiably believes at t1 that one does 
not justifiably believe that p at t1, then one does not justifiably believe that p at t1—then so is the following 
reflection principle: if one justifiably believes at a given time that no-one ever justifiably believes that p, then at 
that time one does not justifiably believe that p. Stated formally: 
 
(RP**) (∀P)(∀s)(∀t)(JBs,t ¬(∃sl,t1)(JBs1,t1 P) → ¬JBs,t P) 
 
(RP**) will validate the inference to (7’’) without relying on any further closure principles. 
18  If one wants to run the argument by appeal to (RP**) instead of (RP)see the above footnoteone will need 
a slightly different case to make the present point. We provide such a case below. 
19  Cf. Kvanvig (2006, 21). 
20  Of course, another consequence is that Pierre can come to justifiably believe a contradiction. This may 
initially seem an unwelcome consequence of the view. However, it is not clear why one could not justifiably 
believe a contradiction (at least so long as it is not an obvious one). A clever logician could easily tell me that 
what, in effect, is a complicated contradiction is true and I could come to believe this contradiction on that basis. 
Since the logician is an otherwise reliable informant on such issues, and since the testimony of reliable 
informants furnishes us with justified beliefs, my belief in the contradiction is surely justified. 
21  We are grateful to Brit Brogaard, Tony Brueckner, Laurence Goldstein, Patrick Greenough, Allan Hazlett, 
Stephen Maitzen, Aidan McGlynn, Alan Millar, Paul O’Grady, David Papineau, Sven Rosenkranz, Peter 
Sullivan and to an anonymous referee from Oxford University Press. Special thanks also go to the editor of this 
volume, Joe Salerno, for all his (considerable) help. 
